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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between audit and non-audit service fees paid to the 
statutory auditor by UK life insurance firms, utilising an extensive panel data sample set for 
the period 1999–2009. Consistent with a knowledge spill over (impairment of independence) 
hypothesis, we predict and find that audit fees are positively (negatively) associated with 
actuarial (tax service) fees. Additionally, our results indicate that regulatory changes enforced 
after 2004 deterred UK life insurance firms from purchasing non-audit services that are 
perceived to impair auditor independence. Finally, we find evidence concerning the inter-
temporal determination of audit fees.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has increased the importance of adopting new, prudential regulation-
related or risk management-related professional attestation services for financial firms to 
demonstrate the resilience of their capital adequacy to adverse economic shocks. Such 
specialised attestation services are also an important source of non-audit fees for the world's 
largest auditing companies, and they raise serious questions over the independence of the 
auditor when performing both auditing and non-auditing verification functions. For example, 
the 2012 Annual Report by Aviva plc, the UK’s largest listed insurance firm, revealed that 
£18.3 million in actuarial advisory services were paid to PwC, which is considerably more than 
the £13.5 million paid for audit services during this same period. However, although the 
Competition Commission (2013) recently concluded that competition was restricted in the UK 
audit market for large companies such as Aviva, it also recommended against imposing legal 
restrictions over the provision of non-audit services.  
A significant component of the non-audit services provided by auditing firms to UK insurers 
concerns the provision of specialised actuarial verification services. However, relatively little 
is known about the relationship between audit and actuarial services and how other forms of 
non-audit services impact the independence of the auditor. Prior research concerning the 
relationship between audit and non-audit services (see reviews by Schneider et al., 2006; Hay 
et al., 2006b; Hay, 2013) finds evidence consistent with two competing hypotheses. The 
knowledge spillover hypothesis supports that the auditor's knowledge about the client spills 
over from the audit to the advisory services, and vice versa (e.g.: Simunic, 1984; DeFond, et 
al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006; Lim and Tan, 2008; Knechel et al., 2012). The impairment of the 
independence hypothesis argues that auditor independence is impaired when audit and non-
audit services are jointly provided (e.g., Canning and Gwilliam, 1999; Whisenant et al., 2003; 
Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Basioudis et al., 2008).  
The empirical validity of the impairment of the independence hypothesis has been given 
additional credence over the last decade as regulatory authorities in the US, EU and UK 
responded to the Enron scandal by imposing greater regulatory oversight over the provision of 
non-audit services (Holland and Lane, 2012). However, it may be less applicable to regulated 
industries such as life insurance firms that potentially strengthen their corporate governance 
through the compulsory purchase of independent specialised (e.g., actuarial) attestation 
services that complement the external audit.  
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The UK insurance industry constitutes a particularly interesting setting for investigating the 
relation between audit and non-audit services for a number of reasons:  
i) The role of the actuary and other risk management professionals has been legitimised through 
the promulgation of UK legislation concerning capital adequacy requirements, and more 
generally through European-wide prudential requirements such as Solvency II.  
ii) The UK insurance industry is one of the most established (over 300 years of history) and 
largest insurance industries in the world (Swiss Re, 2013).  
iii) A major governance scandal in the last decade involving one of the oldest mutual life 
insurers (the Equitable Life Assurance Society) has motivated substantial changes in the 
corporate governance environment of the sector and led to increased oversight of accounting 
and actuarial professions by the industry regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”).  
iv) The FRC recently updated the Combined Code to mandate risk assessment and risk 
tolerance reporting by UK companies subject to the Companies Act, thus highlighting the 
growing importance of attestation services that specialise in risk management (FRC, 2015). 
Prior audit pricing literature has only partially investigated the relationship between audit and 
non-audit fees for this important sector. Early studies (e.g., O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1994, and 
Adams et al., 1997) examined the impact of corporate governance variables on the level of 
audit fees but did not study their interaction with non-audit fees. O'Sullivan and Diacon (2002) 
addressed this issue by using two models where non-audit fees are employed as explanatory 
variables of the level of audit fees: one with the total amount of non-audit fees, the second with 
various fee sub-categories. Although they find that the total amount of non-audit fees appears 
to explain the direct audit fees, none of the non-audit fee components were found to be 
statistically significant. However, O'Sullivan and Diacon (2002) do not account for the possible 
endogeneity of non-audit fees, as suggested by Whisenant et al. (2003). Indeed, the broader 
audit pricing literature has not disaggregated non-audit fees to examine the salience of 
particular regulatory-driven non-audit services, such as actuarial verification (Schneider et al., 
2006: p. 200). Further, prior intra-industry studies have not examined the sensitivity of the 
audit and non-audit fee relationship to the changes in the regulatory and market environment 
over time. 
This study contributes to the existing audit pricing literature in a number of ways. First, we 
study a new dataset to discriminate competing spillover and independence explanations for the 
interaction between fees paid for audit services and various types of non-audit services in a 
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regulated intra-industry setting, the UK life insurance sector. Second, we contribute to the 
literature by examining in more detail the nature of the inter-relation between audit and various 
components of non-audit fees by segregating regulatory-sensitive actuarial attestation and other 
(e.g., tax advice) services. Further, we control for the bi-directional causality between audit 
and non-audit fees by using econometric techniques accounting for endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Third, we examine the intertemporal evolution of audit fees by 
exploiting panel data based on the 18 largest UK life insurance firms over a decade of 
regulatory change. We include the lag of audit fees as a covariate and find that this lag explains 
an important portion of the current-year audit fees. Finally, we examine the impact of 
regulatory changes taking place in 2004–2005 on the variables of interest (i.e., APB Ethical 
Standards, FSA regulation on actuarial roles, and the Companies Act Regulations on the 
disclosure of auditor remuneration).  
We predict and find that fees paid by UK life insurance firms for regulatory-driven actuarial 
services are complementary to audit fees and reflect knowledge spillover, whereas no 
complementarity is detected for non-audit service fees, which may reflect impairment of 
auditor independence. Our comparative results between the pre- and post-change periods 
confirm our predictions that the regulatory changes have modified the strength and magnitude 
of the relationship between audit and total non-audit fees. 
The next section of the paper presents the institutional background. Section 3 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures and reports descriptive 
statistics. In Section 5 we outline and discuss our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Institutional background 
The UK life insurance industry has been exposed to significant developments in accounting 
and actuarial technologies during the last twenty years. A number of innovative actuarial-based 
performance measures were developed in the early 1990s (‘embedded value’) that sought to 
provide shareholders and policyholders with a more ‘realistic’ picture of the profitability of 
insurance firms. Because the disclosure of these numbers is not legally required and hence not 
subject to formal audit, the credibility of the measures is monitored by professional actuaries. 
Moreover, the UK life insurance industry underwent a significant change in business conditions 
during this period. At the end of the 1990s, the sector suffered severe product competition with 
non-insurance competitors and was exposed to increased regulatory scrutiny. As a result, there 
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was significant takeover activity, with over a third of the entire industry being taken over, 
closed or merged with other firms. 
The internal and external corporate governance environments of the UK life insurance firms 
have dramatically changed over the last fifteen years.1 Serious concerns about the corporate 
governance of mutual life insurers were raised after the near collapse of the UK’s oldest mutual 
life insurance company, the Equitable Life Assurance Society. The subsequent government 
report (Penrose, 2004) concluded that there was an apparent failure of the board of directors, 
actuaries and auditors in effectively monitoring the management of the firm and recommended 
an overhaul of the supervision of both the audit and actuarial professions. 
Subsequently, major changes to the regulatory environment were implemented over the next 
few years to further delineate and clarify the provision of audit and actuarial services. First, the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) established three different actuarial roles, made effective 
on 31 December 2004: the actuarial function, the with-profits actuary and the reviewing 
actuary. The first two roles may be fulfilled by an internal employee of the insurance firm, 
whereas the latter should be an independent professional (FSA, 2004). Moreover, the statutory 
auditors of UK life insurance firms are required to make use of a reviewing actuary's opinion 
on any auditable item obtained from actuarial calculations. The reviewing actuary can be either 
an independent professional or a partner in the external audit firm. In practice, and quite often 
in the case of big life insurers, the reviewing actuary is a member of the external auditor 
(Dewing and Russell, 2006).  
Second, a new government-based regulator for the UK actuarial profession, the British Board 
for Actuarial Standards was established under the umbrella of the FRC in 2006, to promulgate 
the independent setting of technical actuarial standards. In parallel, the UK actuarial profession 
updated its own “recommended practice” in Guidance Note 7 (Institute of Actuaries, 2006) 
regarding the roles of and the relationship between the actuary and the statutory auditor. 
Separately, UK company law was changed to improve the transparency of the remuneration 
paid to external auditors. Although UK companies have been required to report the total 
remuneration paid to their auditor for non-audit services since 1991, in 2005 a new regulation 
was issued requiring disclosure of the decomposition of these non-audit fees (Companies Act, 
2005). Schedule 2 of the "Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) Regulations 2005" 
                                                 
1 For a more general treatment of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley changes in the UK regulatory environment and their 
implications for the external auditing see Fearnley and Hines (2003) and Beattie et al. (2013). 
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recommends reporting fees paid to the statutory auditor in the following categories: 1) auditing 
of accounts of associates of the company pursuant to legislation; 2) other services supplied 
pursuant to such legislation; 3) other services relating to taxation; 4) services relating to 
information technology; 5) internal audit services; 6) valuation and actuarial services; 7) 
services relating to litigation; 8) services relating to recruitment and remuneration; 9) services 
relating to corporate finance transactions; 10) all other services. 
Finally, measures were introduced to specifically improve the independence of auditors. The 
Auditing Practices Board (APB) Ethical Standard 5 (APB, 2004) prohibits audit firms from 
providing specific types of non-audit service if "a reasonable and informed third party would 
regard the objectives of the proposed non-audit service engagement as being inconsistent with 
the objectives of the audit of the financial statements". In addition to emphasising the 
importance of the perceived auditor independence, Ethical Standard 5 presents the following 
list of non-audit services that would generally be seen as impairing an auditor's independence: 
internal audit, information technology, valuation, actuarial valuation, tax services, litigation 
support, legal advice, recruitment and remuneration, corporate finance, and accounting 
services.  
However, there is no outright prohibition on the provision of these services and each one of 
them is completed by a set of qualifying conditions. Indeed, the auditor retains discretion over 
whether the various independence impairment conditions are met in deciding whether to 
provide particular types of non-audit services.2 
3. Development of Hypotheses 
3.1 Joint provision of audit and other services by the statutory auditor 
The findings of prior empirical audit pricing literature are generally consistent with one of two 
competing theories concerning the nature of the interaction between jointly provided audit and 
non-audit services. One hypothesis is that there is impairment of auditor independence when 
non-audit services are provided along with the external audit (Canning and Gwilliam, 1999; 
Whisenant et al., 2003; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Basioudis et al., 2008). An alternative 
hypothesis argues that there is knowledge spillover between audit and non-audit services, 
                                                 
2 A more recent version of Ethical Standard No. 5 (APB, 2011) requires (paragraph 84) that audit firms “not 
undertake an engagement to provide actuarial services” unless it is satisfied that such valuation has no material 
effect on the listed company’s financial statements. 
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resulting from economies of scope made by the auditor and shared with the client (Simunic, 
1984; DeFond et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006; Lim and Tan, 2008; Krishnan and Yu, 2011; 
Knechel et al., 2012).  
However, prior research findings are equivocal on the nature and interpretation of these 
relationships. For example, Simunic (1984) and several subsequent empirical studies report a 
positive association between audit and non-audit fees (Palmrose, 1986; Ezzamel et al., 1996; 
O'Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Antle et al., 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006; Hay, 2013) and infer 
the existence of knowledge spillover. However, other studies question whether the positive 
association reflects a transfer of economies of scope from auditor to client (Abdel-Khalik, 
1990; Firth, 1997) because firms purchasing non-audit services from their statutory auditor pay 
higher audit fees than the firms purchasing the same non-audit services from a third-party 
provider (Simunic, 1984; Palmrose, 1986).  
Others disagree whether the nature of these relationships is influenced by the supply of, and/or 
demand for, audit services. For example, Larry et al. (1993) suggest that the improved cost 
efficiency of audit firms providing non-audit services enables them to sell audit services at a 
lower price than the cost of internal controls, thus motivating the client to substitute internal 
control for external audit. By contrast, Firth (2002) claims that the demand for audit services 
is inelastic and suggests that the joint purchase of audit and non-audit services may increase 
simultaneously primarily because of firm-specific events (takeovers, issuance of new shares, 
restructuring, etc.).  
Some empirical studies find a negative relation between audit and non-audit fees (Clatworthy 
et al., 2002; Fields et al., 2004), or report a lack of association (Abdel-Khalik, 1990). Studies 
using simultaneous equation methods accounting for bi-directional causality report a positive 
(Antle et al., 2006; McMeeking et al., 2006) or non-association (Whisenant et al., 2003; Hay 
et al., 2006a) between audit and non-audit fees. 
After reviewing the literature, Schneider et al. (2006) conclude that the relationship between 
audit and non-audit service fees is not clearly established, perhaps because non-audit fees are 
not disaggregated in categories that have a potentially different impact on the auditor's 
independence (Ezzamel et al., 1996). Firth (2002) argues further that by analysing the inter-
relationship between audit and non-audit fees we can only appraise the external perception of 
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auditor independence (Firth, 2002).3 These arguments raise questions over the validity of the 
original Simunic assumption (1984: p. 681) that: (i) non-audit services are a "homogenous 
commodity" and (ii) audit and non-audit services are "neither substitutes nor complementary".  
To address these criticisms, we follow Hay et al. (2006b) by discriminating among different 
categories of non-audit services to examine the complementarity or the substitutionality 
between the audit and different types of non-audit services.4  
An important issue facing regulated industries such as UK life insurance firms is how particular 
types of non-audit services interrelate with audit services. From a client management 
perspective, the statutory audit and some non-audit services can be viewed as substitutes (e.g., 
tax services, bookkeeping and internal audit advice). However, substituting auditing as the 
primary monitoring mechanism for management advisory services, irrespective of whether 
there is knowledge spillover for the auditor or not, may negatively impact the external 
stakeholders' perception of auditor independence (see APB Ethical Standard 5; APB, 2004). 
Moreover, the International Auditing Standards (IAASB, 2012) require auditors to apply a 
professional scepticism rule in performing their attestation mission. This rule prevents the 
auditor from relying upon the honesty of the management, or upon any prior knowledge of the 
quality of internal controls.  
The regulations of the auditing profession raise questions over the validity of Simunic's (1984) 
supply-side assumption that knowledge acquired via the provision of a specific non-audit 
service can be used to justify a reduction in the audit fees. In other words, the economies of 
scope for the auditor resulting from the shared knowledge between audit and non-audit services 
can only be realised if the client's needs for both services are complementary. This assertion is 
consistent with the positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees that is found in most 
of the empirical literature reviewed above. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relation between audit fees and total non-audit fees in 
the UK life insurance industry. 
                                                 
3 Some studies have employed alternative proxies for the impairment of auditor independence, such as the 
propensity to issue a going concern opinion (DeFond et al., 2002; Basioudis et al., 2008) or the stock market 
reaction to non-audit fees disclosures (Holland and Lane, 2012). 
4 We can discard the possibility of independent demand for audit and non-audit services because prior empirical 
research has provided enough evidence for their joint determination (e.g., Whisenant et al., 2003; Hay et al., 
2006a; Antle et al., 2006). 
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We further predict that the general directional relationship between audit and non-audit fees is 
sensitive to public scrutiny over auditor independence over the last decade. We therefore expect 
that the nature and strength of the predicted relation is conditioned by the changing regulatory 
environment affecting the transparency of this relation. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the UK Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) Regulations of 2005 imposed very 
detailed disclosure of the various categories of non-audit fees paid to the statutory auditor. 
Previously, companies had been expected to control only the total amount of non-audit fees so 
as not to exhibit impairment of independence (i.e., no substitution between audit and non-audit 
services). However subsequent to the implementation of these regulations firms were further 
required to “manage” the sub-components of these non-audit fees. Moreover, the auditors' 
Ethical Standard 5 (APB, 2004) provides a detailed list of services that would represent a 
potential threat to the perceived independence of the auditor. Thus, we predict that UK insurers 
will purchase primarily non-audit services that are complementary to the statutory audit in the 
period following the aforementioned regulatory changes. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, the positive relation between audit fees and total non-audit fees in the UK 
life insurance industry will be stronger for the accounting periods starting in, or after 2005 
compared to those starting before 2005. 
We further distinguish between different categories of non-audit fees; a categorisation which 
is important, particularly in regulated industries such as the financial sector (Schneider et al., 
2006). Applying the analysis suggested above (complementarity versus substitutionality of 
audit and non-audit services) in the context of the insurance industry requires taking into 
consideration the two sets of regulations applied to the sector: accounting and prudential. It is 
therefore important to differentiate between three types of fees paid by the insurance firms to 
their statutory auditor: audit fees, actuarial verification fees, and fees for other non-audit and 
non-actuarial services (e.g., tax, legal, financial, strategic). In the context of the UK insurance 
firms, actuarial fees are paid to the reviewing actuary for independent verification of the 
management's actuarial calculations used in preparing the financial reports (FSA, 2004). In 
other words, both actuarial verification and audit services should be purchased from an 
independent third party to satisfy a regulatory requirement. The actuarial attestation is 
conceived as a complementary governance mechanism to the external audit. Moreover, in both 
cases, the assurance service providers bear risks and liabilities towards external stakeholders. 
Therefore, contrary to the problems arising with other types of discretionary non-audit services, 
10 
there is no apparent conflict of interest if the statutory auditor fulfils a reviewing actuary 
mandate5 along with his/her external audit engagement. A positive association between the 
audit and actuarial fees would imply the existence of a knowledge spillover effect in this case. 
For example, if the audit firm finds it necessary to increase its effort on actuarial verifications 
and, hence, increases the actuarial fees, then the firm can justify additional work on the auditing 
contract and increase the audit fees. We therefore posit the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relation between the level of audit fees and actuarial 
fees in the UK life insurance industry (knowledge spillover effect). 
In contrast, when the non-audit services provided by the statutory auditor possess a 
discretionary character, the auditor bears risks and responsibilities towards the client's 
management. Collusion and impairment of independence may arise in the case of the poor 
performance of the client's management. In this situation the management may agree with the 
auditor to communicate a better image of the company by purchasing more accounting 
attestation services, to the detriment of the unsuccessful advisory services. Alternatively, a 
client may negotiate an increase in the purchase of discretionary advisory services by obtaining 
a discount on the total price of the external audit (Fields et al., 2004). Such a discount can push 
the auditor to reduce the quality and/or scope of the audit. Hence, substitutional behaviour 
(negative relationship) in the purchase of audit and discretionary non-audit services will be 
perceived as impairment of the auditor's independence. 
Specific examples of discretionary non-audit services in the UK life insurance industry are the 
"other services relating to taxation", as reported according to the UK Companies Act (2005). 
These services include tax optimisation and related accounting advice, and involve the 
subsequent assessment by the auditor of his/her own consultancy services provided to the 
management. The joint provision of audit and tax services has a negative impact on the 
perceived auditor objectivity (Bedard et al., 2010). Omer et al. (2006) report a negative 
association between tax fees and unexpected audit fees in the post-SOX US context, and 
attribute this finding to the compromised auditor independence. Therefore, we expect a 
substitutional purchase of auditing and tax-related services from the statutory auditor (i.e., 
negative relationship), which would indicate impairment of the auditor's independence. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
5 The statutory auditor should not act as a for-profit actuary according to APB (2004) Ethical Standard 5. 
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H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between the level of audit fees and tax service 
fees in the UK life insurance industry (perceived as impairment of independence). 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
4.1. Sample, data, and variable descriptions 
Sample firms were identified using a three-step procedure designed to ensure consistency of 
the panel over a long period of time. First, sample firms must have been in continuous existence 
for five years prior to the study period. Second, they must not be a subsidiary of another life 
insurance firm operating in the same country. Third, composite insurers should earn more than 
50% of their annual net premium from long-term insurance business. The minimum gross 
annual premium income for the first three years of our sample was arbitrarily set at £10 million 
per year (or other currency equivalent). This assumption is necessary because a large number 
of foreign-owned life insurance firms were either sold or merged in the period 1992–2000. This 
procedure yields a total sample of the 18 biggest UK life insurance firms (after excluding those 
for which annual reports were not available), of which 10 are stock-owned and 8 are mutual-
owned. In total, our sample comprises 198 observations (11 years × 18 companies). Detailed 
information about the sample is provided in the Appendix. 
Table 1 reports comparative annual information on the net premium earned (years 2007–2009) 
and the total financial investment (2005–2009) for sample companies versus all members of 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI). 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
According to Table 1, our sample includes the largest companies in the UK long-term insurance 
sector along with some specialist mutual insurers (i.e., National Farmers, Marine and General, 
Ecclesiastical), and accounts for a large proportion of the assets and risks in the UK insurance 
sector. Although our total sample size is relatively small in comparison to those of prior studies 
in other industries, we note that the concentrated and specialised nature of the provision of life 
insurance in the UK is of relevance to the Competition Commission’s recent investigation of 
statutory services, which was restricted only to the largest companies. 
12 
All data used in the regression models were hand-collected from the companies' annual reports 
and accounts. 
The variables of interest are measured as follows. Audit fees include remuneration payable to 
the statutory auditor for the audit of the company and its subsidiaries. Other fees pursuant to 
legislation are excluded from the amount of audit fees because they were typically reported in 
the total amount of non-audit fees before 2005 according to The Companies Act 1985 
(Disclosure of Remuneration for Non-Audit Work) Regulations 1991 (Companies Act, 1991). 
Following the above, non-audit fees include remuneration paid for services pursuant to 
legislation plus all other non-audit fees. Data for tax and actuarial fees are collected for the 
accounting periods starting in, or after 2005, according to the disclosure requirements of The 
Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) Regulations 2005. For the years before 
2005, companies reported the decomposition of non-audit fees at their discretion and, therefore, 
the collection of consistent data for tax-service and actuarial fees was not possible. Fees for tax 
services are measured by the amount reported in the annual accounts under the title "other 
services relating to taxation". Actuarial fees are either measured by the amount of auditor 
remuneration for services labelled as "actuarial", if reported, or proxied by the residual non-
audit fees (reported as "all other services"). 
We also use the following control variables: independence of the board, ownership structure, 
free asset ratio and rate of premium growth. Prior research has suggested that improved internal 
corporate governance, reflected in a more independent and efficient board of directors and audit 
committee, typically leads to more external auditing (Hay et al., 2006b; Hay, 2013). We control 
only for the independence of the entire board because the audit committees in the UK are not 
vested with legal rights and responsibilities, and all auditor-related decisions are signed by the 
unitary board (Beattie et al., 2012). We expect a positive association between audit fees and 
the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors (measured at year end). The 
independent directors are identified in the annual reports according to the definition of the 
Revised Combined Code (Revised Code, 2003). 
According to prior research, the ownership structure (mutual versus stock-owned) may 
significantly impact the level of audit fees in the insurance industry (O'Sullivan and Diacon, 
2002). We control for this effect by using a binary variable, which assumes the value of 1 if 
the firm is stock-owned and 0 if it is mutual. 
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Prior to the publication of the Penrose Report (2004) and the Myners Review (2004), the focus 
of the UK regulation on the independence of the board was directed primarily towards stock-
owned companies. Therefore, any association between board independence and the amount of 
audit fees may be a result of the stock-owned companies, which represent approximately half 
of our sample. To extract the impact of stock ownership from the effect of the ratio of 
independent directors on the level of audit fees, we use an interaction variable.6 
According to the audit pricing theory, specific firm characteristics such as size, complexity, 
and riskiness are the fundamental determinant of the level of audit fees (Simunic, 1980; 
Simunic and Stein, 1996). We scale our variables of interest by the total assets to control for 
the size of the firm.7 Complexity and riskiness are proxied by the free asset ratio and the rate 
of year-to-year change in the total net premium, respectively.8 The free asset ratio (excess of 
total assets over regulatory reserves, divided by total assets) measures the solvency of an 
insurance firm. A high free asset ratio indicates less debt to be collateralised by assets and, 
thus, less complex valuation and audit work. We therefore expect a negative relation between 
audit fees and the free asset ratio.9 On the other hand, an increase in the net insurance premium 
implies greater cash flows and investment (i.e., higher risk), and requires relatively more audit 
work. Thus, we expect a positive association between the change in the total net premium and 
the level of audit fees. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate the importance of the time dimension on the behaviour of audit 
and non-audit fees. If we ignore the time dimension (Figure 1), the average audit and non-audit 
fees for 11 years exhibit the same behaviour in the cross-section of companies. This is not the 
case if we discard the cross-section dimension by averaging the fees by year (Figures 2 and 3). 
                                                 
6 Although board independence and ownership structure are used here only as control variables, isolating their 
interactive effect on the level of audit fees may be of interest for the cumulative knowledge in the field. 
7 See section 5 for more details. 
8 Variables used in prior research to control for complexity, riskiness and other firm specific characteristics 
include: current ratio, leverage, receivables and inventory, number of subsidiaries, Big 4 auditor, etc. (Knechel et 
al., 2012; Zaman et al., 2011; Gul and Goodwin, 2010). These controls are not appropriate for our analysis because 
of the specificity of the insurance firms' activity and financial statements. Moreover, all firms in our sample are 
audited by a Big 4 auditor. 
9 As a similar measure in the case of pension funds, Cullinan (1997) reports a negative relation between audit fees 
and the ratio of total fund assets/fund liabilities. 
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Therefore, the robustness of our analysis will be enhanced if we use a panel-data specification 
(Chou and Lee, 2003). 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURES 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, there is a substantial increase in the average audit fees 
starting in 2004, which may be attributed to the improved corporate governance environment 
(Taylor and Simon, 1999). 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of sampled UK life insurance firms for the entire sample 
period (1999–2009), and the sub-periods before (1999–2004) and after the Companies Act 
regulations on the disclosure of auditor remuneration (2005–2009).   
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
There are significant differences between stock-owned and mutual firms. Stocks are larger than 
mutual firms over the entire sample period. Probably as a consequence of this difference in 
size, UK stock companies pay significantly greater audit and non-audit fees over the entire 
period, as well as greater actuarial and tax service fees for the sub-period 2005–2009. 
Moreover, mutual firms maintain a significantly lower free asset ratio than stocks. However, 
this difference is weaker in the period 2005–2009. Finally, mutual firms appear to have a higher 
ratio of independent directors on the board than their stock-owned competitors. 
Approximately two-thirds of our observations illustrate cases of a joint purchase of audit, 
actuarial and tax services.10 
                                                 
10 The relevant statistics are available upon request. 
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5. Empirical specification and results 
5.1 Baseline model 
The following issues were considered and addressed in the selection of the estimation method 
and specification of the audit fees model: 
i) The existence of endogenous variables. The bi-directional causality (simultaneity) between 
audit and total non-audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003) gives rise to endogeneity problems. 
Neglecting the presence of endogenous variables results in biased inference. We tackle this 
problem by using instrumental variables and generalised method of moments (IV/GMM) 
estimation techniques. These techniques, by building on the methodology of two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), enable us to estimate only the equation of interest (audit fees equation) and 
account for the presence of a system of equations. 
ii) Total assets and ownership structure. Total assets are endogenously determined by the 
ownership structure (according to Table 2, mutual firms are significantly smaller than stock-
owned firms). We resolve this issue by deflating all fees by total assets and excluding the latter 
from our specification, as proposed by Simunic (1984).11 
iii) Non-normal distribution of (non-)audit fees. The existing literature addresses this problem 
by log-transforming the (non-)audit fee variables. Nevertheless, a logarithmic model implies a 
non-linear relationship between the dependent variable and its regressors. More importantly, 
such a model assumes a constant rate of change of audit fees with respect to the changes in the 
non-audit fees and total assets, as well as an increasing/decreasing rate of change of audit fees 
with respect to the changes in the non-log-transformed regressors. All of these assumptions are 
highly debatable (Picconi and Reynolds, 2013). We resolve the non-normality issue in a 
different way: In the case of the standard IV estimation, we produce robust standard errors to 
account for violations in the normality assumption. Moreover, the GMM approach (Hansen, 
1982) does not require the normality of error residuals. 
                                                 
11 Simunic (1980: pp.178–180) proposed to scale the audit fees by the amount of total assets raised to the power 
of , where  is estimated as the regression coefficient in the model Ln(audit fees) =  +  × Ln(total assets). He 
obtained  = 0.45 and experimented with values of 0.33 (cubic root) and 0.5 (square root). Simunic (1980) decided 
to use 0.5 for computational and best-fit purposes. Following the same method, we obtained  = 0.75 and used 
two rounded values for the exponent, 0.5 and 1. The results reported here use exponent 1 for two reasons: i) the 
bivariate relationship between audit and non-audit fees appears less dispersed and more linear with  = 1 compared 
to  = 0.5; ii) the interpretation of the regression coefficients is more intuitive with the ratio of (non-)audit fees to 
total assets. Scaling the audit and non-audit fees by the square root of total assets yields similar results in terms of 
the sign and magnitude of the regression coefficients, however the level of significance of the estimated 
coefficients is lower.  
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iv) Company (cross-section) specific characteristics. Part of the variance of (non-)audit fees 
may be explained by firm-specific characteristics such as a busy season at financial year-end, 
the presence of foreign operations, or the product mix. We use cross-section random and fixed 
effects estimations to control for these characteristics. 
v) Demutualisation of companies. Three firms in our sample demutualised during the period 
of study (see Appendix). The results reported below consider those companies as stock-owned. 
As a robustness check, we performed all estimations treating these entities as mutual firms. 
The results we obtained do not significantly differ from those reported hereafter. 
Table 3 reports the correlations among the variables under consideration.  
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
Following the above discussion, our empirical specification is represented by: 
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where 
t denotes the time dimension and i identifies the firm; 
AUDITF_TA = Audit fees in million £ divided by total assets in million £;  
NONAUDITF_TA = Total fees payable to the auditor for services other than a direct audit in 
million £, divided by total assets in million £; 
ACTUARIALF_TA = Fees payable to the auditor for actuarial services in million £, divided by 
total assets in million £; 
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TAXF_TA = Fees payable to the auditor for taxation-related services in million £, divided by 
total assets in million £; 
INDDIR = Independent directors on the board over the total number of directors;  
FREEASSETR = Free Asset Ratio = (Total Assets – Technical Provisions)/Total Assets;  
PREMGRWT = Growth rate of the total net premium earned;  
STOCK = Dummy variable indicating whether the company is stock-owned (=1) or mutual 
(=0); 
i = Unobserved firm-specific random effects; 
it  = Usual error term (observation specific error). 
The specification in equations (1) to (4) implies that the error term consists of two elements: 
i  and it . Because (1), (2), (3) and (4) contain an observed time-invariant variable (STOCK), 
the most appropriate estimation method is the one proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
(H-T hereafter). A fixed-effects specification is inappropriate for this case because the effect 
of STOCK will be absorbed by the fixed effects. In other words, such a specification does not 
allow for observed time-invariant regressors. However, random effects treatment does allow 
for such an assumption, but it is based on the hypothesis that explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the unobserved time-invariant random variable. Nevertheless, this is not true 
in our case because there is a bi-directional causality between audit and non-audit fees, i.e., 
AUDITF_TA and NONAUDITF_TA (in (1) and (2)), or AUDITF_TA, ACTUARIAF_TA, and 
TAXF_TA (in (3) and (4)). Therefore, ACTUARIAF_TA, TAXF_TA and NONAUDITF_TA 
should be treated as endogenous. The H-T random effects model accommodates all of the 
above problems. 
Table 4 reports the results of the H-T estimates for the entire sample period and for the sub-
periods before and after the regulatory change in 2005. According to Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010), the validity of instruments is checked using the Sargan-Hansen test. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
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For the entire sample period, Table 4 shows a positive and statistically significant regression 
coefficient of NONAUDITF_TA as predicted by hypothesis H1a.  
Testing hypothesis H1b requires breaking our sample into sub-periods before and after the 
regulatory changes that occurred in 2005. For the period before the revised Companies Act, 
our regression results show a statistically insignificant association between NONAUDITF_TA 
and AUDITF_TA. In contrast, the period after 2004 is characterised by a strong and positive 
relation between NONAUDITF_TA and AUDITF_TA. This result provides strong evidence in 
favour of hypothesis H1b. 
The results in Table 4 corroborate hypothesis H2a; the regression coefficient in (3) and (4) 
indicate a positive and strongly significant relationship between ACTUARIALF_TA and 
AUDITF_TA. However, the coefficient of TAXF_TA is negative but statistically insignificant 
and, therefore, hypothesis H2b is not supported. 
Regarding the effect of our control variables, the coefficient of INDDIR is negative and 
significant at the 10% level only for the period 1999–2009, when we control for the interactive 
effect of ownership structure. Furthermore, stock-owned insurers appear to pay relatively lower 
audit fees per £ of total assets compared to mutual-owned insurers, but only when the total non-
audit fees are used as regressors. Moreover, the effect of FREEASSETR is negative and weakly 
significant for the entire sample period in the case of specification (2) and for the period after 
2004 for (3) and (4). Finally, the impact of PREMGRWT appears to be negative and weakly 
significant for the entire sample period when the interaction variable is included in the 
specification.  
Finally, the constant is positive and statistically significant for the majority of specifications, 
along different sample periods. This result is expected because the effect of total assets is 
reflected in the constant term by construction. 
5.2 Robustness check controlling for a dynamic effect in audit fees 
In this subsection we modify our initial specification to account for a possible inter-temporal 
dependence in the level of audit fees. The rationale behind this is that usually the starting point 
of the negotiation process for audit fees is the amount of audit hours as well as the audit fees 
per hour paid by the client in the previous year. This "memory effect" might be particularly 
important when audit firm rotation is not mandatory, which is the case in the UK. 
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More specifically, we can assume that the current year level of audit fees depends on a target 
level of fees estimated and negotiated in advance by the auditor in relation to the previous 
year’s fees already tuned to the fundamentals of the client. Further adjustments are made based 
on the actual characteristics of the client during the current period. However, these current year 
adjustments would change only a limited portion of the fees, whereas their primary amount 
would remain guaranteed by the initial fee negotiation. Therefore, the prior-year level of audit 
fees should be able to explain an important share of their current year value. 
To this purpose, the following equations were estimated: 
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  (6) 
where 
AUDITF_TAit-1 = Lagged value of AUDITF_TA; 
iv = Unobserved firm-specific fixed effects. 
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated by using the Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of 
Moments (A-B GMM hereafter).12 This can be justified on the following grounds. In (5) and 
(6) the first lagged value of our dependent variable is included in the set of explanatory 
variables. This gives rise to autocorrelation. The A-B GMM tackles this problem. Moreover, 
the A-B GMM (i) controls for the endogeneity problem previously mentioned, (ii) accounts for 
the case where firm-specific characteristics, such as product mix (i.e., share of life and non-life 
policies sold), are correlated with the explanatory variables and (iii) is appropriate for 
estimating panels where the cross-section dimension (18 firms in our case) is higher than the 
time dimension (11 years in our case). However, the A-B GMM is a fixed effects estimator that 
estimates the first-differenced version of (5) and (6) and, therefore, STOCK is not included in 
the specification (see also the discussion in sub-section 5.1 about the shortcoming of the fixed-
effects specification). 
                                                 
12 For more details see Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond (2002). 
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More specifically, (5) and (6) are estimated using a system A-B GMM13 instead of a first-
difference A-B GMM. The primary reason is that the system A-B GMM increases efficiency 
in cases where the lagged levels of the regressor are poor instruments for the first-differenced 
regressors. This may be true in our case because some of our instruments may be weakened as 
a result of the regulatory events. Moreover, Blundell and Bond (2000) showed that when the 
dependent variable is persistent (i.e., when the coefficient of the first lag of AUDITF_TA is 
close to one), then the accuracy of the estimates is dramatically improved by the use of the 
system A-B GMM. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
According to Table 5, the lag of AUDITF_TA has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient in all cases. The highest value of the coefficient is observed when we estimate (6) 
for the period after the regulatory change in 2005 (1.071). 
Moreover, the results in Table 5 corroborate hypothesis H1a for the entire sample period, as 
well as for the period after the regulatory change; the coefficient of NONAUDITF_TA is 
positive and strongly significant for the above periods. This result, in combination with the fact 
                                                 
13 The system A-B GMM estimator estimates the system of the following equations (where  is the first difference 
operator): 
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in the case of (5) and 
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in the case of (6).  
We used the command –xtabond2- in Stata to perform our estimation (Roodman, 2005). More precisely, the two-
step robust estimator was used.  
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that NONAUDITF_TA appears to have a non-statistically significant impact on AUDITF_TA 
for the sub-period 1999–2004, provides strong evidence in favour of hypothesis H1b. 
The positive and strongly significant coefficient of ACTURIALF_TA provides support for 
hypothesis H2a. However, hypothesis H2b is weakly corroborated by the negative and 
significant coefficient of TAXF_TA at the 10% level. In summary, the purchase of actuarial 
services appears to be complementary to that of audit services, whereas tax services decrease 
the demand for statutory audit services (substitutional effect). 
The only significant control variable is PREMGRWT (its coefficient is negative and weakly 
significant) and only under specification (6). Finally, the constant is significant at the 10% level 
only when we estimate (6) for the sub-period 2005–2009. 
5.3 Estimation results of the log-log audit fee model 
As a sensitivity analysis we tested the traditional log-log audit fee model. We log-transformed 
all of the fees variables and we included ln(SIZE) in the specification as an endogenous 
variable. Using the H-T estimation, we found that only the constant and the coefficient of 
ln(SIZE) are significant. For ln(SIZE) the coefficient is: for period 1999–2009, 0.656 and 0.652 
in log-transformed models (1) and (2), respectively; for period 1999–2004, 0.468 and 0.486 in 
log-transformed models (1) and (2), respectively; for period 2005–2009, 0.407, 0.425 and 
0.431 in log-transformed models (1), (3) and (4), respectively. The estimation of the constant 
varies between -4.138 and -6.560 in the different log-transformed models. Furthermore, in the 
case of model (1), for the period 2005–2009, the coefficient of ln(NONAUDITF) (0.120) is also 
statistically significant.  
The corresponding results for the A-B GMM estimation are as follows. For the entire sample 
period, only the coefficients of ln(AUDITF)t-1 (0.834), ln(SIZE) (0.124) and the constant (-
1.376) are statistically significant. For the period 1999–2004, only the coefficient of 
ln(AUDITF)t-1 (0.882) is significant. For the period 2005–2009 in model (5), only the 
coefficients of ln(SIZE) (0.388), FREEASSETR (-0.894) and the constant (-3.867) are 
statistically significant. Finally, for the period 2005–2009 in model (6), only the coefficients 
of ln(SIZE) (0.441), FREEASSETR (-0.757) and the constant (-4.664) are significant.  
In the majority of the log-transformed equations the R2 (H-T estimation), the F-statistic (A-B 
GMM) and the corresponding specification tests are weaker than in our non-log-transformed 
models. These results validate our argument against the log-transformed specification (see 
section 5.1, point iii).  
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5.4. Analysis and discussion 
The results of our two estimation methods (H-T and A-B GMM) show that the firm-size 
adjusted level of non-audit fees has a positive impact on the firm-size adjusted level of audit 
fees for the entire sample period and for the period after the regulatory changes. This result 
corroborates our expectation that UK life insurance firms are selecting the non-audit services 
purchased from the statutory auditor in a way that the non-audit fees do not exhibit a 
substitutional relation with the monitoring cost paid for the statutory audit.  
The absence of a statistically significant causal relationship between non-audit and audit fees 
for the period 1999–2004, in conjunction with the positive and significant relationship for the 
period 2005–2009, implies that, after the regulatory changes were implemented in 2005, UK 
life insurance companies (auditors) have become more 'cautious' about the nature of non-audit 
services purchased (sold) along with the statutory audit. 
The aforementioned regulatory changes lead us to test the impact of two important categories 
of non-audit fees (actuarial service and tax service fees) on the level of audit fees. By 
accounting for the primary components of the non-audit fees in our specification, we obtain 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis H2a. In particular, we observe complementary 
behaviour (positive relation) between audit fees per £ of total assets and actuarial fees per £ of 
total assets. When the client's characteristics require a higher level of actuarial effort, it is 
reasonable to expect that the reviewing actuary, acting also as a statutory auditor, will increase 
the effort and the fees related to the external audit engagement. The observed complementarity 
in the demand of actuarial and auditing services generates economies of scope for the auditor 
flowing from the shared knowledge of the client and other common resources used in both 
services.  
Regarding the taxation-related fee, only the A-B GMM estimation provides support, although 
weak, for hypothesis H2b. As suggested by our hypothesis, we observe substitutional behaviour 
(negative relation) between audit fees per £ of total assets and fees paid for tax services per £ 
of total assets. From a corporate governance perspective, it is unlikely to expect that attestation 
services intended to provide assurance to an external stakeholder about the quality of 
management's reporting (monitoring cost) can be substituted for advisory services intended to 
directly benefit the management. Therefore, we conclude that this substitutionality will be 
detrimental to the perceived auditor independence.  
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Finally, the fact that the coefficient of the lag of AUDITF_TA is statistically significant in all 
of the A-B GMM estimations highlights the importance of the inter-temporal determinacy of 
the audit fees, rarely examined in the prior empirical literature. More precisely, the coefficient 
of AUDITF_TAt-1 for the entire sample period suggests that approximately 65 per cent of the 
audit fees per £ of total assets are determined by the firm-size adjusted level of audit fees in the 
previous year and are not explained by the current year fundamentals. To the best of our 
knowledge, this finding has not been reported in prior empirical literature. 
6. Conclusion  
Prior accounting literature has given limited attention to the joint provision of audit and non-
audit assurance services within the highly regulated insurance sector where firms are required 
to purchase both accounting and actuarial attestation from independent external reviewers. Our 
study delineates and clarifies the existing literature in the context of the UK life insurance 
industry in the period 1999–2009. Specifically, we examine the impact of two important non-
audit service categories (actuarial and tax services) on the pricing of the statutory audit, both 
before and after the enhanced non-audit fee disclosure requirements imposed by the Companies 
Act regulations of 2005. 
Our results are mostly consistent with our predictions that UK life insurance firms 
predominantly purchase non-audit services such as actuarial services to generate knowledge 
spillover for the auditor. The complementarity between audit and non-audit services in the 
entire sample period is even stronger in the sub-period 2005–2009. We therefore conclude that 
the regulatory changes enforced in 2005 have achieved their objective to dissuade auditors and 
their clients from contracting non-audit services that will be perceived as impairing an auditor's 
independence. In contrast, tax service fees are weakly and negatively associated with audit 
fees. Such substitution of audit for discretionary advisory services indicates an impairment of 
auditor independence. These findings highlight the importance of disaggregating the non-audit 
fees in the context of the dually regulated insurance sector (Schneider et al., 2006). Finally, 
approximately 65% of the current audit fees are explained by their prior period level. This 
suggests that the time dimension should not be ignored when modelling the determinants of 
audit fees. However, this result is at the best indicative and should be further scrutinized. 
Although our sample accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the assets and revenue of the 
UK life insurance industry, the small number of companies in the sample led us to restrict the 
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list of potential control variables. Future specialised industry studies may tackle the issue of 
sample size by extending their scope to companies from different countries.  
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